Abstract
This paper discusses the Ethiopian position in the negotiations over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) between Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt, with a particular focus on Sudan’s position. The analysis concludes that the GERD crisis is more a result of geopolitical and historical tensions than purely technical or economic issues. Although the GERD carries significant potential for achieving shared benefits, it has instead become a symbol of tension between upstream and downstream states. The paper emphasizes that resolving the crisis requires political will and a move toward a broader regional vision that includes water, food, energy, and economic integration. Otherwise, the failure to reach an agreement could result in long-term political and economic consequences.
Overview
This paper aims to examine the course of negotiations surrounding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam across its various stages, starting from the period before the dam’s construction until the completion of its first filling in 2024. The analysis focuses on the positions of the three concerned countries (Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt), with particular emphasis on Sudan’s position and the factors influencing it.
Sudan is considered the most affected by the GERD, especially regarding the safety of the Roseires Dam reservoir due to its geographical proximity to the GERD. In contrast, Egypt is primarily concerned about potential impacts due to distance and the large storage capacity of the GERD reservoir. Ethiopia, as the upstream and host country of the dam, enjoys a strategic advantage. The paper suggests that the main driver of the ongoing dispute over the GERD lies primarily in geopolitical and strategic interests rather than purely technical or economic motivations.
The paper analyzes the negotiation process over the GERD in its different phases, including: the pre-construction phase (before 2011), the International Panel of Experts report in 2013, the Tripartite National Committee in 2014, the Declaration of Principles (DoP) in 2015, the National Independent Scientific Research Group in 2018, the rounds of negotiations in late 2019 and early 2020, the Sudanese initiative from April to June 2020, discussions at the UN Security Council in 2020 and 2021, African Union-led negotiations from 2020 to 2021, the UAE initiative during 2022–2023, and finally the most recent negotiations in 2023. The key challenges and opportunities at each stage are discussed.
Although the GERD presents an opportunity to achieve mutual direct benefits for the three countries, it has instead become a source of tension and a multiplier of risks to regional stability, due to its entanglement with broader regional and international geopolitical dynamics in the Nile Basin. In recent years, the situation has evolved from technical and legal disagreements over water management into a deeper strategic dispute, threatening regional cooperation and raising concerns that the area may shift from a zone of cooperation to one of potential instability.